JGCRP Meeting

03 December 2025



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Agenda

Introduction: 10 mins
- **Welcome Members;**
- **Minutes and Actions from Previous Meeting.**

Discussion: 15 mins
- Power System Resilience.

Modification Proposal: 45 mins
- MPID345 – Fault Ride Through, RoCoF and Post Fault Active Power Recovery for Demand Facilities

Updates: 15 mins
- **CRU; and**
- **Utility Regulator.**

AOB. 5 mins



1. Introduction: 10 minutes

a. Welcome Members

b. Minutes and Actions from Previous Meeting (25 September 2025)



03/12/2025

Discussion

Power System Resilience
Grid Code Considerations



Presentation objective

To set out the context for potential future changes to the Grid Code(s) to support enhanced resilience of the power system

Drivers:

- Critical Entities Resilience Directive, NIS-2 Directive, and Network Code on Cyber Security.
- Updated Risk Preparedness Plan for Ireland
- Updated National Risk Assessment
- Learning from incidents and exercises - national and European ENTSO-E
- The need for enhanced assurance processes
- Anticipated changes to the EU Energy Security Architecture

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Critical Entities Resilience Directive (CER Directive)

Transposed as S.I. No. 559/2024 – European Union (Resilience of Critical Entities) Regulations 2024 - 17 Oct 2024

Implementation


- National Strategy on Resilience of Critical Entities
- Identification of Critical Entities 2026 (CRU)


Key elements


- Risk Assessments
- Resilience Measures
- Incident Notification
- Employee Security Management
- Compliance and Reporting.

Links to

- National Risk Assessment (2023) – updates
- Risk Preparedness Plan (RPP)







Updated every 4 years

Critical Entity resilience plan requirements


Chapter	Summary
Resilience Governance	Demonstration of leadership intent, establishment of a culture of resilience, consideration of resilience during strategy and investment planning, an overall resilience management system and associated controls
Risk Management	Overview of the risk management system, incl. engagement of the board and/or managing body in the governance of the system, and the role of independent challenge and assurance
Scenario Testing	Identification of Reasonable Worst Case Scenarios (RWCS), assessment of impact, and mitigation measures
Risk Assessment	A summary risk assessment in line with the Critical Entity risk assessment methodology (set out in Appendix C).
Risk Mitigation	For risks beyond the EirGrid risk appetite or > 1:50 year likelihood of resulting in an impact of moderate (or higher), the mitigations details of the system for ensuring the implementation, and effectiveness
Crisis and incident Management Plans	A summary of the crisis/incident management plans and processes which are in place to manage the impact of any disruption of essential service (s) by the Critical Entity
Business Continuity Plans	A summary of the crisis/incident management plans and processes which are in place to manage the impact of any disruption of essential service (s) by the Critical Entity
Emergency Plans	A summary of the emergency plans associated with installations, storage facilities, equipment, and infrastructure
Resilience by Design	A summary of the precautions taken in the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of any installation, storage facility, equipment, and infrastructure critical to the delivery of essential services by the Critical Entity,
Supply Chain Resilience	A summary of the strategy and risk mitigation measures adopted to ensure the resilience of the supply chain
Resilience Testing	The approach, including details of testing plans and independent or external assurance. Also the confidence provided by such testing, along with any key improvement areas identified

Risk Preparedness Plan for Ireland (RPP)

Regulation (EU) 2019/941 on Risk Preparedness in the Electricity Sector







RPP updated every 4 years

- Approved by the CRU in May 2023 after feedback from the European Commission.
- Currently being updated – for publication Q1 of 2026

Key elements

- National electricity crisis scenarios – 25 identified, based on the 23 regional electricity crisis scenarios identified in 2024 by ENTSO-E
- Procedures (non-market measures, load shedding) – including TEG and Retained Units
- Cross-border support
- Crisis coordination and national response structures
- Exercise programme

Links to

- National Risk Assessment (NRA 2023)
- Energy Security Package (published by DCEE Nov 2023)
- Critical Entities Resilience Directive (CER Directive)

	Name of the scenario
	Weather
W.SS	Severe summer
W.SW	Severe winter
W.ST	Severe storm
W.IL	Heavy ice loading
W.FL	Heavy flooding
W.DF	Renewable Energy Source Shortage, including Dunkelflaute
W.FE	Unusually big demand / RES forecast errors
	Natural
N.SW	Space weather
	Malicious Acts
M.AA	Physical attack on critical assets
M.AC	Physical attack on control centres
M.AE	Attack on entities not connected directly to the grid
M.CA	Loss of ICT systems to cyber-attack
M.UA	Unauthorised action by personnel
M.AS	Targeted political malicious actions by entity/ adversarial states
	Technical
T.IA	Large nuclear/industrial accident
T.SD	Serial technical defects
T.GI	Grid instability caused by unanticipated interaction with new technology.
	Supply chain
S.FF	Fossil fuel shortage
S.NF	Nuclear fuel shortage
	Human
H.PA	Pandemic
H.IA	Industrial action, strikes, riots potential international
H.IM	Unforeseen interaction of energy markets
	Adequacy
E.SO	Simultaneous forced outage of 2 or more power plant/ interconnector
I.NI	Non-delivery of planned infrastructure projects
I.GD	Rapid above trend growth in electricity demand

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National Risk Assessment (NRA)

Decision 1313/2013/EU on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism (as amended by Decision (EU) 2019/420)

NRA updated every 4 years

- Last updated in 2023.
- The NRA process, has been updated to address the requirements of the CER Directive.
- CER risk scenarios should draw on the NRA reasonable worst-case scenarios (RWCS) that form part of that assessment (addendum to NRA 2023 has been published with a full NRA process planned during 2026 and the results published in 2027.


Key elements

- Several scenarios that could impact the energy sector
- Loss of gas connection to the UK, coinciding with a period of high demand, represented the reasonable worst-case scenario related to Disruption to Electricity/Gas.

Links to

- Risk Preparedness Plan (RPP)
- Critical Entities Resilience Directive (CER Directive)





A: Storm*** ↔	I: Damage to Undersea Infrastructure** ↔	Q: Animal & Plant Disease*** ↔
B: Snow*** ↓	J: Disruption to Electricity/Gas*** ↑	R: Food Chain Contamination*** ↔
C: Ice and prolonged Low Temps*** ↓	K: Disruption to Oil Supply*** ↔	S: Nuclear Incident Abroad*** ↔
D: Flooding*** ↑	L: Mass Inward Population Displacement** ↔	T: Antimicrobial Resistant infection*** ↔
E: Air Incident*** ↔	M: Disruption to Critical Supply Chain*** ↑	U: Pandemic*** ↑
F: Transport Infrastructure/Hub*** ↑	N: Water Supply Disruption/Contamination*** ↑	V: Terror Attack*** ↔
G: Maritime Incident** ↑	O: Large Crowd Event*** ↔	
H: Cyber attack*** ↔	P: Disruptive Use of Drones*** ↔	

Potential changes to Grid Code requirements and/or procedures being considered

Power System Resilience (Q4 2025)

- Large Demand Facility fault ride-through requirements (Agenda item)

Secondary fuel availability and stock levels (Q1 2026)

- Replenishment of secondary fuel after tests
- Replenishment of secondary fuel during natural gas emergencies incidents (continuity as well as NRA/RPP extreme natural gas emergency scenario)
- Already implemented: new GPI on secondary fuel availability applied from 1st Oct
- Changes to secondary fuel test procedure: extended operation (24/48 hrs)
- Requirements related to potential future LNG power gas plants

Critical Entities (Q2/3 2026)

- Requirements related to Remote Operating Centres with significant generation / demand under control (notably during major incidents and in relation to malicious attacks scenarios)
- Other potential requirements based on risk assessments undertaken – particularly in relation to Critical Entities identified by the CRU by Aug 2026

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Thank you



2. Modification: 45 minutes

MPID345
SPID_03_2025

Fault Ride Through, RoCoF and Post Fault Active Power Recovery for Demand Facilities



Background

- The fault ride through issue is a significant and growing challenge to the ability of the TSOs to operate the power system securely.
- The TSOs are having to take operational actions to manage this challenge – these actions are negatively impacting on energy market outcomes, interconnector exports, some market participants and renewable generation. In addition, this issue resulted in a decision not to increase the SNSP limit from 75% to 80%.
- This is a new issue internationally and is not unique to Ireland/N.Ireland. However, we are more exposed.
- There has been significant engagement with industry on this matter including multiple industry webinars and bilateral meetings. We are grateful to industry and their representative bodies for this constructive engagement which has enabled evolution of the the fault ride through Grid Code modification proposals.
- As we work together with industry, government and regulators on this critical issue, our priority remains to ensure system stability, power quality and security of supply for all users of the power system.

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Modification Timeline

Sept. 2024	JGCRP - Discussion Item
Oct. 2024	Industry Webinar 1
Dec. 2024	Industry Webinar 2
Dec. 2024	JGCRP - Discussion Item
Sept. 2025	JGCRP - Discussion Item
Nov. 2025	Industry Webinar 3
Nov. 2025	Industry Webinar 4
Dec. 2025	JGCRP - Final Modification Proposal

Bi-lateral Mtgs

Updates:

Initial FRT Proposal

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Active Power Recovery Time Defined
RoCoF, Voltage and Frequency Ranges


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Response during fault clarified
Recovery Threshold Updated
Modification Split (Non-DCC)

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Current Data Centres and New Technology Loads and Forecast Growth

- The highest monthly average data centre demand to date is approximately 800 MVA.
- Most data centres are connected on the transmission system but a significant proportion is also connected to the distribution network. Most are located in the greater Dublin area.
- There is approximately 2000 MVA of demand capacity that is contracted to data centres and other new technology loads at the transmission level, and approximately a further 300 MVA contracted at the 110 kV distribution level.




Ireland demand expected from assumed build out of data centres and new technology loads (All-Island Resource Adequacy Assessment 2025-2034)

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Data Centre Fault Response

- Following a transmission system fault that causes a transient voltage dip on the power system, some data centre demand has been observed to reduce for a prolonged period before being automatically restored.
- This demand reduction arises as data centres automatically switch their consumption from the grid to their own back-up Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) systems.
- This response happens within milliseconds and is done to protect IT equipment within the data centre.
- The sensitivity of data centre protection systems is such that any significant transmission fault at 220 kV can trigger this response (typically any voltage less than 0.7 to 0.8 p.u. for 20 milli-seconds triggers a switchover to UPS).
- This demand reduction causes a significant imbalance on the power system (demand << generation) which results in a positive Rate of Change of Frequency (RoCoF) and frequency rise that is seen by the whole power system.



1. A transmission system fault causes a transient voltage dip.

2. The output of generation sources dip during the fault but recover quickly once the fault is cleared.

3. Some data centre demand reduces during the fault and fails to recover for a prolonged period

4. The result is an imbalance between generation and demand.

Illustration of fault impact and grid user response


Data Centre Fault Response – Actual Events


- A number of significant data centre demand reduction events have been observed on the power system.
- The level of fault-initiated reduction in data centre demand has increased as data centre demand increases.


Date	Transmission System Contingency	Data Centre Demand Reduction	Percentage of Total Data Centre Demand
7 Jan 2022	Limerick: Killonan-Kilpaddoge 220 kV Fault	74 MW	16%
13 Dec 2022	Dublin: Kellystown-Woodland 220 kV Fault	204 MW	34%
26 Jan 2025	Dublin: Poolbeg 220 kV Reactor Fault	321 MW	44%
8 May 2025	Dublin: North Wall – Poolbeg 220 kV Fault	387 MW	52%

All of the contingency events observed to date were single-phase faults. For a three-phase fault, significantly higher demand reductions would be observed.

Disturbance propagation (contour map) and collective Data Centre Response (08 May 2025, 220 kV fault in Dublin)







Scenarios with increased Data Centre Demand - No additional mitigations



Fault

- Transmission fault close to a HVDC interconnector
- Widespread voltage disturbance across the power system for a short period

Interconnector Disconnection

- HVDC Interconnector export is lost
- Large imbalance (demand less than generation)
- Frequency increase and high RoCOF

Large Demand Reduction

- Voltage disturbance triggers reduction in demand at some large demand facilities
- Frequency and RoCoF increases are exacerbated as imbalance increases

Wind Farm Disconnections

- Special protection schemes activate to trip multiple windfarms to assist in rebalancing the power system.

DC Demand Considered (MW) / Risk	RoCoF (Hz/s)	Zenith (Hz)	DC demand tripped (A) (MW)	Interconnector export loss (B) (MW)	Overall demand reduction (A+B) (MW)	Wind Generation shed (MW)
600	0.79	50.66	491	500	991	571
800	0.89	50.74	655	500	1155	747
1000	1.09	50.81	829	500	1329	823
1200	1.07	50.90	990	500	1490	939
1500	1.24	51.06	1237	500	1737	1105
2000	1.56	51.10	1586	500	2086	1437

Violation of limits/ security standards

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Overview of Power System Analysis Results

800 MW Case: 655 MW of data centre demand reduction + 500 MW EWIC trip resulting in 747 MW of wind generation shedding

Risk Level	Description
Secure	The power system remains within operational limits using standard operational and market mitigations (e.g. generation re-dispatch and activation of reserves) for credible contingencies.
Secure following reliance on activation of cross-border and/or system defence measures	Reliance on cross-border measures (such as HVDC Interconnector flow restrictions and/or North-South Tie-Line restrictions) and system defence measures (such as over frequency generation shedding) are required to maintain key system metrics (such as RoCoF and frequency) within operational limits. Activation of automatic over frequency generation shedding gives rise to further operational challenges due to the loss of this generation including the voltage and frequency response services provided by these units.
Insecure	Power system is not secure due to violation of system limits for a credible contingency. High risk of major power system failure including the potential for a significant system incident.

Study Scenario	Data Centre Demand Case (MW) / Risk	Key Message
1. Base Case - No additional mitigations	600 800 1000 1200 1500 2000	At the existing level of data centre demand (approximately 800 MW) the potential level of imbalance is significantly above normal LSI/LSO levels and requires activation of system defence measures to mitigate. Without further significant additional mitigations, the currently contracted level of data centre demand (approximately 2000 MW) would result in power system insecurities
2. Modelling of a 1 sec demand recovery time, no additional Reserves/Inertia	600 800 1000 1200 1500 2000	Application of fault ride-through capability with a restoration time of 1 second (at all data centres) is insufficient to adequately secure the power system.
3. Modelling of a 500 ms demand recovery time, no additional Reserves/Inertia	600 800 1000 1200 1500 2000	Application of fault ride-through capability with a restoration time of 500 milli-seconds (at all data centres) significantly improves overall system security. However, System Defence Measures continue to be required and insecurities remain at higher data centre demand levels.
4. Modelling of a 500 ms demand recovery time, with additional Reserves (+600 MW) / Inertia (+ 2 x Synchronous Condensers)	N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2000	Significant additional System Services / Grid solutions are needed to accommodate 2000 MW of data centre demand in addition to the implementation of fault-ride through capability. (Note only a 2000 MW data centre demand case was considered in this scenario).

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Recent Industry Engagement

- Industry Webinar held on 3 November – attended by over 50 industry representatives, CRU and DCEE.
- An industry webinar was held on 26 November to provide an update on the proposed requirements, following feedback from stakeholders on the information paper and the proposed Grid Code modifications.
- c.21 recent bi-lateral meetings with data centre owners/developers and other transmission connected demand customers….other customers offered meetings.
- 'Large Demand Facility Fault Ride-Through Issue and Proposed Solutions' Information paper updated and re-issued by EirGrid and SONI on 17 November 2025 along with the updated Grid Code Modification Proposal.



Main Industry Feedback (pre-17 November proposal update)

The main areas of feedback relevant to the Grid Code modification proposal and its implementation have been categorised as follows:

- Proposed Modification
- Timelines
- Compliance / Derogation Processes

Main Industry Feedback: Proposed Modifications

Industry Feedback	Our Response
No market ready solutions that meet the proposed FRT requirements currently exist	We are aware that the data centre industry is actively engaged in development of technical solutions to the FRT issue. For example, one OEM has indicated that a technical solution could be available for commencement of roll-out during 2026.
Some suggested clarifications/changes to the modification (clarify what 'remain connected' means and challenges with achieving 95% demand recovery post fault).	TSOs clarified that "remain connected" means the facility should stay electrically connected to the transmission system. During a voltage dip, demand may switch to backup systems but should restore at least 90% of pre-fault demand within 500 ms after fault clearance and voltage recovery to 90% of nominal voltage. Based on stakeholder feedback, the recovery requirement was revised to 90%, aligning with other system users (PPMs and HVDC).

Main Industry Feedback: Proposed Modifications

Industry Feedback	Our Response
Concern that the analysis that has informed the proposed modification only considers the currently contracted data centre level (approx. 2 GW).	The proposed modification addresses key power system challenges at current, and contracted, data centre demand levels. The impact of data centre demand beyond currently contracted levels, and analysis of other technical challenges associated with the integration of new technology loads onto power systems, are subject to further consideration.
Some non-data centre customers did support the proposal from a grid security perspective.	We acknowledge and appreciate this support. The proposed modification is designed to enhance overall system resilience and maintain security of supply for all customers.

Main Industry Feedback: Timelines


Industry Feedback	Our Response
Concern with the proposed Grid Code modification timeline i.e. targeting 3 December 2025 Grid Code Panel for final presentation of the proposal.	The first draft of the modification was shared with the Joint Grid Code Panel in September 2024, and broader industry in October 2024. The modification was updated and shared at the September 2025 Joint Grid Code Panel meeting for further feedback. The final proposed modification was published on 17 November 2025 incorporating our consideration of this feedback.
Insufficient time for customers (particularly non-data centres) to assess their ability to comply.	We acknowledge this concern and will ensure it is factored into our compliance and derogation management processes, while continuing to engage with stakeholders to provide clarity and support.
Insufficient time for customers to engage with OEMs on technical solutions	We recognise this challenge and will maintain active engagement with both customers and OEMs. For example, one OEM has indicated that solutions may be available during 2026, and we will continue to facilitate discussions to support timely compliance.

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Main Industry Feedback: Compliance / Derogation Processes

Industry Feedback	Our Response
A high risk of widespread non-compliance would result from application of the requirements to all existing demand facilities.	We acknowledge that there is significant concern from industry on potential non-compliance resulting from the application of the proposed grid code requirements. We are actively working on proposals for compliance/derogation processes to accompany the proposed requirements. There will be further engagement with industry over the coming weeks on this issue.
This will lead to severe reputational damage for the impacted customers and 'Ireland Inc'.	The application of the proposed requirements will strengthen grid resilience and support Ireland's reputation as a leader in sustainable energy growth. Continued collaboration with industry will help mitigate potential reputational impacts.
This is a non-standard approach when compared internationally.	The grid code modification approaches are following established grid code governance arrangements.

Proposed Grid Code FRT Requirements



Required Voltage against time profile as proposed as part of forthcoming EirGrid/SONI code modification proposal

Demand Facilities shall remain connected to the Transmission System during and following any Fault Disturbance on the Power System which results in a Voltage deviation which remains on or above the voltage-against-time profile specified in (EirGrid/SONI Grid Code Reference Figure TBC) at the Connection Point.

Following clearance of the Fault Disturbance, the Demand Facility should return to at least 90% of its pre-fault Demand within 500 milliseconds of the Transmission System Voltage recovering to 90% of the nominal Voltage. The post Fault Disturbance ramp up rate for the Demand Facility, shall be coordinated and agreed between the TSO and the Demand Facility owner.

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Full Modification Proposals

Requirement	Non DCC*	DCC*
Requirements for different Voltage ranges	**NEW:** Remain synchronised to the Transmission System and operate within the ranges of the Transmission System Voltage at the connection point, for an unlimited time period, as specified below: 400 kV system: 360 kV to 420 kV (0.9 p.u. – 1.05 p.u.) 220 kV system: 198 kV to 245 kV (0.9 p.u. – 1.114 p.u.) 110 kV system: 99 kV to 123 kV (0.9 p.u. – 1.118 p.u.)	EXISTING: Remain synchronised to the Transmission System and operate within the ranges of the Transmission System Voltage at the connection point, for an unlimited time period, as specified below: 400 kV system: 360 kV to 420 kV (0.9 p.u. – 1.05 p.u.) 220 kV system: 198 kV to 245 kV (0.9 p.u. – 1.114 p.u.) 110 kV system: 99 kV to 123 kV (0.9 p.u. – 1.118 p.u.)
Requirements for Frequency range and operational time Frequency	**NEW**: Minimum Time Periods for Demand Facilities, Closed Distribution Systems and Distribution Systems to Remain Operational without Disconnecting Frequency Range Time Period 47 – 47.5 Hz 20 seconds 47.5 – 48.5 Hz 90 minutes 48.5 – 49 Hz 90 minutes 49 – 51 Hz Unlimited 51 – 51.5 Hz 90 minutes 51.5 – 52 Hz 60 minutes	EXISTING: Minimum Time Periods for Demand Facilities, Closed Distribution Systems and Distribution Systems to Remain Operational without Disconnecting Frequency Range Time Period 47 – 47.5 Hz 20 seconds 47.5 – 48.5 Hz 90 minutes 48.5 – 49 Hz 90 minutes 49 – 51 Hz Unlimited 51 – 51.5 Hz 90 minutes 51.5 – 52 Hz 60 minutes
ROCOF requirement	**NEW:** Remain connected to the Transmission System during rate of change of Transmission System Frequency of values up to and including 1Hz per second as measured over a rolling 500 milliseconds period. (Voltage dips may cause localised RoCoF values in excess of 1 Hz per second for short periods, and in these cases, the Fault-Ride Through clause CC.7.4.3.2 supersedes this clause (CC.7.4.3.1) EirGrid Grid Code reference- SONI Grid Code reference CC.14.1.5	
FRT requirement	**NEW:**Demand Facilities shall remain connected to the Transmission System during and following any Fault Disturbance on the Power System which results in a Voltage deviation which remains on or above the voltage-against-time profile specified in Figure CC.7.4.3.2 (EirGrid Grid Code reference- SONI Grid Code reference tbc) at the Connection Point. The voltage-against-time profile specifies the required capability as a function of voltage and Fault Ride-Through Time at the Connection Point before, during and after the Fault Disturbance.	
Active Power Recovery Requrement	**NEW:** Following clearance of the Fault Disturbance, the Demand Facility should return to at least 90% of its prefault Demand within 500 milliseconds of the Transmission System Voltage recovering to 90% of the nominal Voltage. The post Fault Disturbance ramp up rate for the Demand Facility, shall be coordinated and agreed between the TSO and the Demand Facility owner.	

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*DCC = Demand Connection Code


Splitting of Modification Proposals

Mod 2 – Subject to separate CBA/consultation

Requirement	Non DCC	DCC
Requirements for different Voltage ranges	NEW: Remain synchronised to the Transmission System and operate within the ranges of the Transmission System Voltage at the connection point, for an unlimited time period, as specified below: 400 kV system: 360 kV to 420 kV (0.9 p.u. - 1.05 p.u.) 220 kV system: 198 kV to 245 kV (0.9 p.u. - 1.114 p.u.) 110 kV system: 99 kV to 123 kV (0.9 p.u. - 1.118 p.u.)	EXISTING: Remain synchronised to the Transmission System and operate within the ranges of the Transmission System Voltage at the connection point, for an unlimited time period, as specified below: 400 kV system: 360 kV to 420 kV (0.9 p.u. - 1.05 p.u.) 220 kV system: 198 kV to 245 kV (0.9 p.u. - 1.114 p.u.) 110 kV system: 99 kV to 123 kV (0.9 p.u. - 1.118 p.u.)
Requirements for Frequency range and operational time Frequency	NEW: Minimum Time Periods for Demand Facilities, Closed Distribution Systems and Distribution Systems to Remain Operational without Disconnecting Frequency Range Time Period 47 - 47.5 Hz 20 seconds 47.5 - 48.5 Hz 90 minutes 48.5 - 49 Hz 90 minutes 49 - 51 Hz Unlimited 51 - 51.5 Hz 90 minutes 51.5 - 52 Hz 60 minutes	EXISTING: Minimum Time Periods for Demand Facilities, Closed Distribution Systems and Distribution Systems to Remain Operational without Disconnecting Frequency Range Time Period 47 - 47.5 Hz 20 seconds 47.5 - 48.5 Hz 90 minutes 48.5 - 49 Hz 90 minutes 49 - 51 Hz Unlimited 51 - 51.5 Hz 90 minutes 51.5 - 52 Hz 60 minutes
ROCOF requirement	NEW: Remain connected to the Transmission System during rate of change of Transmission System Frequency of values up to and including 1Hz per second as measured over a rolling 500 milliseconds period. (Voltage dips may cause localised RoCoF values in excess of 1 Hz per second for short periods, and in these cases, the Fault-Ride Through clause CC.7.4.3.2 supersedes this clause (CC.7.4.3.1) EirGrid Grid Code reference- SONI Grid Code reference CC.14.1.5	
FRT requirement	NEW:Demand Facilities shall remain connected to the Transmission System during and following any Fault Disturbance on the Power System which results in a Voltage deviation which remains on or above the voltage-against-time profile specified in Figure CC.7.4.3.2 (EirGrid Grid Code reference- SONI Grid Code reference tbc) at the Connection Point. The voltage-against-time profile specifies the required capability as a function of voltage and Fault Ride-Through Time at the Connection Point before, during and after the Fault Disturbance.	
Active Power Recovery Requirement	NEW: Following clearance of the Fault Disturbance, the Demand Facility should return to at least 90% of its prefault Demand within 500 milliseconds of the Transmission System Voltage recovering to 90% of the nominal Voltage. The post Fault Disturbance ramp up rate for the Demand Facility, shall be coordinated and agreed between the TSO and the Demand Facility owner.	

Existing Requirements – no change

Mod 1 – Bring to December 2025 GCRP




EirGrid SONI

Next Steps – EirGrid Grid Code Modification Process

- A framework for compliance and derogation management processes is under development in line with the requirements in GC.9 of the EirGrid Grid Code. An update on this framework will be circulated to the JGCRP (and wider industry) with the JGCRP meeting minutes.


- A webinar to outline the proposed compliance / derogation framework is being planned for January 2026. Industry feedback will be invited.

- Submission of Grid Code Modification recommendation, including panel feedback and accompanied by the proposed compliance / derogation framework, will issue to CRU towards the end of January 2026.



Next Steps – SONI Grid-code Modification Process

- 3rd December SONI Grid Code panel – Proposal Brought to SONI Grid Code Review Panel (GCRP)
- Mid January 2026 Commence Public Consultation on SONI Grid Code Modification SPID_03_2025
- SONI will review consultation feedback mid February 2026
- Submission of Grid Code Modification recommendation, including panel feedback, SONI will issue to Utility Regulator end February 2026.



Thank you!

Questions?





4. Updates: 10 minutes

a. CRU; and
b. Utility Regulator.



4. Updates: 10 minutes

a. CRU; and
b. Utility Regulator.



CRU Update

Recommendation Papers with CRU for decision: 3

MPID 319, MPID 320, MPID 327

AOB

Meeting Minutes will be issued by COB 17 December 2026

Members can submit their comments by COB 09 January 2026

Merry Christmas and Best Wishes for 2026.